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Price-Band Stabilization Programs and Risk:
An Application  to the U.S.  Corn Market
Matthew T. Holt
The impacts of introducing a partial price stabilization scheme in the U.S. corn
market  are  investigated  by  using  a  modified  version  of the bounded  price
variation model. Specifically, a model is developed  and estimated that includes
rational expectations of the first three central moments of the (truncated) equi-
librium price  distribution.  The  estimated model  is used to simulate market
equilibrium  effects of introducing upper and lower price limits through a tax-
subsidy scheme. The results show that corn producers are downside risk averse,
and that market feedback effects  of price stabilization can,  at times, be more
important than direct effects.
Key words:  downside risk aversion,  price stabilization,  rational expectations
equilibrium.
Introduction
Government  programs  have played  an important  role  in U.S.  agricultural  markets  for
over  50  years  (Gardner).  While  a variety of policy instruments  have been  used,  price
support loans, target price-deficiency  payment  schemes, and acreage  set-aside  programs
have emerged as the cornerstone  of U.S. agricultural policies for many major field crops.
As a result, much research has focused on determining the effects of government programs
on agricultural  supply,  demand,  and price  relationships  (Lee and  Helmberger;  Chavas
and Holt;  Holt 1992).
There also is growing evidence, presumably due to risk aversion, that price, production,
and/or income variability are significant factors in aggregate  agricultural  supply relation-
ships (Pope and Just; Coyle;  Holt and Moschini).  If, as the empirical evidence  suggests,
risk is important in agricultural supply decisions, and if these risks cannot be shared fully
through existing contingent claims markets, it is desirable to explore ways of controlling
or mitigating the effects  of uncertainty on agricultural markets (Newbery and Stiglitz).L
Recent studies have provided insights  into the effects  of reducing  or eliminating  agri-
cultural price and income risks in a market equilibrium framework (e.g., Brorsen, Chavas,
and Grant; Myers; Innes  1990a, b). While much of this work quantifies benefits associated
with eliminating  risk,  it follows  that formal  relationships  between  government  policy
instruments and risk perceptions of agricultural producers have not been well established.2
In other words, the mechanism by which agricultural  price and income instability can be
reduced through government  intervention  is not well defined.
Developing linkages between government price support activities and the price and risk
perceptions of agricultural  producers is desirable.  This is because  complete elimination
of risk, either through available contingent  claims markets or through government  pro-
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grams, is likely an unattainable  goal. Alternatively, partial  price  or revenue  stabilization
may be the most realistic outcome (Miranda and Helmberger).
Considering the above, the objectives  of this article are:  (a) to develop a framework for
examining the effects of government programs on producers'  price and risk expectations,
and (b)  to determine  empirically the potential impacts  of partial price  stabilization im-
plemented through a tax-subsidy scheme on the U.S. corn market. The conceptual frame-
work  developed  follows  Eeckhoudt  and  Hansen  in that  price  supports  are  deemed  to
effectively truncate  producers'  subjective probability distributions of price. The model is
closed by assuming producers form expectations  rationally.
Essential features of the conceptual model are incorporated into an econometric  model
of the  U.S. corn  market by modifying the bounded  prices  model  under rational expec-
tations (Shonkwiler and Maddala;  Holt and Johnson) to include risk terms. Unlike prior
estimates  of risk  response in aggregate  supply  models,  the  model  specified  here  incor-
porates, in addition  to a price  variance term, a measure  of the third central moment of
price.  Inasmuch  as  price  support  programs  are  designed  to  moderate  downside  price
movements,  and to the  extent that producers exhibit  downside  risk aversion,  inclusion
of a third moment  term  can  be  empirically  and  economically  important  (Antle  1987;
Menezes,  Geiss, and Tressler).
The resulting  model is used to simulate  endogenous  market response  associated with
stabilizing prices partially through a system of minimum and maximum price bands. The
results show, for instance, that as band widths are reduced,  expected production actually
can increase  even though expected market and producer prices decline. This result is due
exclusively  to  the  reduction  in price  risk  associated  with  "squeezing"  minimum  and
maximum price limits. Such findings underscore the importance of analyzing government
intervention in a market equilibrium  setting.
Conceptual  Framework
This section  develops  a market model that includes  rational expectations,  price  uncer-
tainty,  and risk-averse  producers.  The conceptual  framework provides a foundation for
empirical work reported in following  sections.
Consider a competitive industry consisting  of N identical  firms, each  producing a ho-
mogeneous commodity and facing a random output price, p. Although free entry and exit
are permitted,  the number of firms N is fixed in the short  run. Due  to production  lags,
the output price is not observed  at the  time production  decisions are made. Production
technology is represented by the concave production function q = fJT),  where x is a vector
of inputs.  To simplify the analysis,  production is assumed to be nonstochastic. Random
market price p is characterized  by the stochastic inverse demand function,
(1)  p  = D(Q  ),  O, p/OQ < 0,
where  E is  a random  variable  with distribution  function  H(e) and  Q = Nq is industry
output.  A  given  value  for anticipated  output,  say  Qe,  determines  the  conditional  price
distribution, F(p I Qe). Consequently,  expected market price is
(2)  p(Qe)  =  p dF(p I  Qe)  =  D(Qe,) dH(),
and second- and higher-order central  moments of the price distribution  are given by
(3)  (Qe)  = J  (p  p)k dF(p  Qe) =  [D(Q,  ) - D]
k dH(),  k > 2.
Government  intervention occurs through a system of minimum and maximum prices
that are used to support and stabilize prices received by producers.3 The minimum price
is denoted by Pm and the maximum price is given by PM. Following Quiggin and Anderson,
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this minimum-maximum price system is enforced by a tax-subsidy or buffer-fund scheme.
Producers  receive a direct per-unit  subsidy equal to (Pm  - p) if the realized market price
falls below the minimum  price.  Likewise,  if the market price  exceeds PM, producers  pay
a direct per-unit tax equal to (p - PM). Otherwise,  the stabilization agency takes no action.
Minimum and maximum price limits truncate  the probability density function of price
as perceived  by producers from  below at Pm and  above at PM (Eeckhoudt  and Hansen).
The resulting  random  price  v is equal  to Pm when p  <  Pm and is equal to PM when p >
PM. Random variables v and p coincide ifPm < p < PM.  Hence,  the truncated conditional
density  g(v  I Q)  takes  a  zero  value  in the intervals  [0,  pm]  and  [PM,  oo].  At p = pm,
g(v  I Q) assumes a value equal to the probability F(Pm I Q);  at p = PM, g(v  I Q) takes a
value equal to the probability  1 - F(PM I Q). For values ofp strictly between Pm and PM,
the densities f(p  I Q) and g(v  I Q) are identical.
Under  risk aversion,  firms  attempt to  maximize  expected utility of profit.  Assuming
that  each  firm  possesses  a  von Neumann-Morgenstem  utility  function  u(r),  which  is
increasing (du/dr < 0) and concave (d2u/dlr 2 < 0) under risk aversion,  the problem  is:
(rPM
(4)  max Eu(r I Qe) =  u[vf(x) - r'x] dG(v  I Qe)
{X}  Pm
where  ir  = pf(x)  - r'x is random  profit  (r being a vector  of known input  prices),  and
G(v  [ Qe)  represents the decisionmaker's  subjective  beliefs about the price  distribution
G(v  I Q). The first-order conditions associated  with (4) are:
(5)  - E = J  u' [vf(x)  - r'] dG(  I Qe)  '. ax  -
Pdm~
Assuming sufficient second-order conditions are satisfied, (5) can be solved for the optimal
choice functions,  x*( r, v, ak;  Qe)  and q*(r, v, o;  Qe)  = f(x*(r,  v,  ; Qe)).  Here,  v denotes
the mean of the density g(v  I Qe)  and o  denotes a vector of second- and (possibly) higher-
order central  moments associated with g(v  I Qe). 4 The notation  used indicates that each
firm's optimal decisions depend on the subjective estimate,  Qe,  of industry output.
Industry supply is obtained  by summing firm-level  supply across  all producers and is
given by
(6)  Q = Nq*(r,  v,  fk;  Qe)  Q(r,  ak;  Qe).
To close the model, it is necessary to relate anticipated  output (Qe)  to actual production
(Q). This correspondence  is obtained by assuming that agents form rational expectations
about the truncated price distribution, g(v  I Q) (Newbery and Stiglitz).  This implies that
if industry output Q in (6) differs  from expected output Qe,  agents will revise their output
estimates.  Hence,  a short-run equilibrium is characterized  by the condition  Qe = Q, the
closing identity in  a rational  expectations  model with  price  uncertainty  and risk-averse
agents.
Under a competitive rational expectations  equilibrium, industry output represents the
fixed  point  of the mapping  from  the  right-hand  side  to  the  left-hand side  of (6).  The
equilibrium of industry output and expected moments of price solves the system of m +
1 equations:
(7a)  Q*  = Q(r,  v,  _k;  Q*);
('PM
(7b)  v  = PmF(Pm I  Q*) +  p dF(p I Q*) +  PM[l - F(PM I Q*)];
Pm
(PM
(7c)  o° =  [Pm - P]F(pm I Q*)+  [p - p]  dF(p I Q*)
Pm
+ [PM  - ][1  -F(PM I Q*),  j = 2,...,  k.
HoltJournal  of  Agricultural  and Resource Economics
Eeckhoudt  and Hansen investigated  comparative  statics  associated  with a mean-pre-
serving price  squeeze implemented through  a minimum-maximum  price  system. While
their results  show a mean-preserving  price  squeeze will unambiguously  increase  output
of risk-averse firms, they did not consider market feedback.5 In the present case, a positive
supply  response  induced  by  a minimum-maximum  price  squeeze  will  result in  lower
expected market prices.  But expected market prices determine the values of the moments
for the truncated price distribution in (7). The net result is that changes in minimum and
maximum prices will have both a direct (i.e., truncation) and an indirect (i.e., changes in
expected price due to changes in output) impact on the moments of the effective producer
price distribution,  g(v  I Q).
As illustrated  in subsequent  sections,  the indirect  effect  may at  times  dominate  the
direct  effect.  This means  the expected  producer  price,  v, would  fall  as the  minimum-
maximum  price band is  squeezed.6 Consequently,  the implications  of stabilizing  prices
within a pre-specified band for production,  expected producer price, and other variables
of interest become an empirical issue when market feedback is incorporated.
Estimation Framework
In this  section,  an  empirical  framework  is developed which  maintains  key  elements  of
the stylized model of the previous section including rational expectations, exogenous price
limits,  stochastic  demand,  and risk-averse  producers.  Specifically,  the bounded  prices
model under rational expectations  considered by Shonkwiler and Maddala, by Holt and
Johnson, and by others  is extended to include higher-order  moments of the (truncated)
producer price distribution (Holt 1989).
Consider the following market model with an exogenously set lower price limit,  Pt:7
(8)  Dt =  'Xlt 1 + a*P t +  1Et;
(9)  s=t  __  2t -+  0Pe  · +  2  · +  #3 (9)  1St  =  zX 2 t  +  2PTP  +  33  crt +  v3  t  +  E2t;
(10)  Qt= Dt= St,  if Pt  Pt;
(11)  Qt = Dt < St,  if Pt > Pt,
where  Dt is quantity  demanded,  St is quantity  supplied,  Qt is  quantity  transacted,  Pt is
market clearing price, and Pt is the rational expectation of price formed when production
decisions  are  made.  Likewise,  a2  is the  rational  expectation  of price  variance  and  a3
denotes the rational expectation  of the third central moment of price. Terms Xlt and X2t
denote vectors of supply and demand shifters, respectively, and Elt and c2t are joint normally
distributed random variables  with mean zero and  variance-covariance  matrix 2,  where
vech(2) = (a
2,  -2,  2T 12)'  denotes unique elements in S. With observations  on Pt and Pt, the
data points belonging to equilibrium ('I) and those belonging  to excess supply  (,2)  can
be classified.
The  model  in (8)-(11)  represents  a  market  for a  commodity  where  price  supports
truncate the equilibrium  price distribution and where agents form rational expectations.
The aggregate  supply equation differs in a novel way  from many previous specifications
in that both second and third central moments of price are included.  The third moment
is incorporated  because  price  support  programs  not only have  reduced  the range  over
which prices can vary, but they also have modified the "shape"  of the price distribution.
The distribution's "shape"  can be important if producers exhibit downside risk aversion
(Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler).  One way of  determining empirically the degree of downside
risk aversion is to include a measure of skewness in the supply equation,  such as the third
central moment (Antle  1987).
Expressions for rational expectations of relevant moments of corresponding market and
producer price distributions are derived in the following  manner. The restricted reduced-
form price equation derived from (8)-(10) is:
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(12)  Pt = (a*)-l(:lX2t + f*Pte +  20'*2  +  A3*34  - alXlt  +  62t-  Et).
Taking the expectation  of (12)  conditional  on  t-1,  the information  set available  at the
time production decisions are made, gives the rational expectation of market price in the
absence of government  intervention:
(13)  P*  = (a*)- '(8Xt  +  ;*P; +  *  t,  +  *  t*3  - -aXt),
where Xlt and X2t denote, respectively, the expectations of (unknown)  demand and supply
shifters.
Truncation effects of the price support program are incorporated  by accounting for the
probability  that the support price will be effective.  Given joint normality of error terms
Elt  and  c2t  and linearity of the structural equations,  it follows that the  underlying market
price  (e.g.,  untruncated)  distribution  is  also  normal.  Expressions  relating  the  rational
expectation  of market price in (13) to expectations  of the first three central  moments of
the effective producer price  distribution are:
(14)  Pt  = Pt(Kt)  + o,q(Kt)  +  P*[l - ()],
(15)  +,  = P  K(Kt)  +  Kt4(K,) +  2Pa4,(K,)  +  [PT 2 +  oP][l  - ,(Kt)] - p
(16)  a 3  =  P2  [P  - 3PT](f(Kt)+  K(K)
+  3j2(P*  - Pt)Kt+(Kt)
+  [20' +  3Pt*2%  - 6PTPt*]¢(Kt)
+  [P* 3 - 3PtP*  +  3  o2(P*  - P2)][l  - I(Kt)]  +  2P13,
where
(17)  Kt= [P,  - (a*)-l'(Xt +  PTe  +  *  +  :32  - A,)]/
and
(18)  a 2 =  (o*)-  2(+118,  + (43/2 a1  +  c 1 r3 3 1 +  2- +  - 2(12).
Here,  (*.)  and  (. )  denote,  respectively,  the  distribution  and density  functions  of the
standard normal, 41  is the variance-covariance  matrix associated with (unknown) supply
shifters,  i,2 is  similarly  defined  for demand  shifters,  and  1/3  is the variance-covariance
matrix  between  Xlt  and  X 2t.8 Likewise,  1 - D(Kt)  = prob[P, - Pt], the probability  the
support  price  is  not effective.  Expressions  for moments  of the effective  producer  price
distribution in equations (14)-(16) are nonlinear functions of the support price, the prob-
ability of market equilibrium,  and the mean and variance of the underlying market price
distribution.
The  simultaneous  solution  of equations (13)-(16)  yields  rational  expectations  of the
first three central  moments of the effective producer  price distribution.  Clearly,  an ana-
lytical  solution  cannot  be  obtained;  but given  some  initial estimates  of the structural
parameters,  it  is  possible  to solve  the  system  numerically.  Following Fair  and  Taylor
(1983,  1990),  a Gauss-Seidel  algorithm is embedded in an iterative maximum likelihood
estimation routine  to obtain full  information  maximum  likelihood (FIML) estimates  of
a nonlinear rational expectations model.  See Holt and Johnson, or Holt (1992), for further
details.
Empirical Model  and Estimation Results
The above producers are used to estimate a bounded prices model of the U.S. corn market
that includes risk terms and rational expectations.  The model  consists of four structural
equations:  (a) aggregate  corn  demand  (including stock demand),  (b) aggregate  corn pro-
duction,  (c) total acres planted  to corn, and (d) average corn yield per planted acre. Four
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autoregressive models also are specified in the model for predicting values  of (unknown)
exogenous variables used in the iterative rational expectations  simulations.
Model Specification
The demand equation is specified as
(19)  QDt = ao +  aPCt  +  a2EXRt  + a3INCt  +  a4GCUt +  Elt
where PCt is average price of corn received  by farmers,  EXRt denotes the exchange  rate
weighted by corn exports to foreign markets,  INCt is total disposable  income, and GCUt
is a grain-consuming  animal units index.  The exchange  rate  is included to account  for
growth in foreign demand for corn during the sample period. Income is included to reflect
shifts  in derived  demand  for  corn  due to increased  consumer  demand  for corn-based
products.  Likewise, higher livestock inventories as measured by grain-consuming  animal
units should enhance demand.  All prices and income are deflated by the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) (1967  = 100). For observations belonging to  I1,  the market is in equilibrium,
QDt = QSt + STKt_,,  where STKt_  represents carryover  stocks, and PC, is freely deter-
mined. For observations  in *2,  the market  is in disequilibrium, QDt =  QSt + STKi -
CCCt, where  CCCt denotes  government removals,  and PCt is set equal to the loan rate.
A linear equation  is specified  for total production,  which  depends  on  aggregate  corn
acres planted and average  yields. 9 That is,
(20)  QSt = fo  +  ,3ACRt +  3 2YLDt  +  c2t,
where ACRt denotes total acres planted to corn and YLDt is average corn yield in bushels
per planted  acre.
The corn planted acreage  equation  is specified as
(21)  ACR, =  Yo  +  tlPf  + 72 V2t +  73V3t  +  y4DAt +  -yCPt
+  7 6WLTt1  +  7 7ACRt- 1 +  3t.
Here,  Pe,  a2t,  and at denote,  respectively,  the rational expectations  of the  first,  second,
and third central moments of the (real) effective producer price distribution as defined in
(14)-(16).  Also, DAt denotes corn acres idled under government programs and CPt is per
acre  cost of production  for corn.  Initial real wealth of corn producers,  denoted by  WLTt_1
and constructed  in a manner similar  to that described in Chavas  and Holt, is included  as
well. Acres  idled under government  programs  are  included to account for the reduction  in
supply  associated with set-aside programs (Holt  1992).10 Costs of production  are used as  a
measure of input prices.  Initial wealth is included to facilitate a wider range of risk response,
i.e.,  to  allow for risk response  that is not necessarily  constrained  to  constant  absolute  risk
aversion  (Pope and Just). Last, lagged acres  are included to allow for partial adjustments  in
attaining  desired  acres planted  to corn.  Wealth and cost variables  are deflated by the one-
period lagged CPI.
The yield equation is specified as
(22)  YLD  = 60  + 61DAt'  + 62WI t +  63t  + e4 t.
Positive square roots of diverted acres are included to account for yield slippage induced
by acreage set-asides (Love and Foster). The variable WIt is an index of  weather conditions,
computed  as  the  first principal  component  of temperature  (in degrees  Fahrenheit)  and
precipitation  (in inches)  during the growing  season  (June-August)  in the Corn Belt.  A
linear trend (t) is included to reflect technological  advances in corn yields over time.
To complete the rational expectations model, second-order autoregressive (AR) models
were specified for the exchange rate and the first difference of disposable  income. A first-
order AR model with first-  and second-order  lags on corn price  was specified  for grain-
consuming animal units. Finally, because  producers don't know the real support price at
the time planting decisions are made, a second-order AR model was specified for the real
support price.11
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Table 1.  Coefficient  Estimates
Standard  Standard
Coefficients  Errors  Coefficients  Errors
ao  -118.1414  95.3441  5o  35.3189  1.8345
a,  -27.9387  3.2609  b,  .7369  .3243
a2  -. 7722  .3472  62  14.6662  3.5241
a3  4.9196  2.6791  63  1.9752  .0653
an4  1.1915  .4937  Vo  3.3903  3.1585
Pi  .9897  .0041  vl  1.3134  .1153
do  -62.9003  2.9122  v2  -.3544  .1174
51  .7561  .0321  ,o  1.8656  .2706
/2  .7301  .0190  X 1 .2216  .0989
P2  .5926  .1271  72  -. 2254  .1030
3o  7.2359  .4281  00  33.2366  8.5743
'i  2.8561  2.1352  01  -4.1534  1.2060
72  -17.4339  7.1553  02  1.7595  1.2667
73  21.5135  9.4666  03  .5917  .1072
74  -.6999  .0339  co  -.0737  .2728
75  -. 1006  .0654  C  1.1555  .1341
76  .0947  .0406  o2  -. 1723  .1331
77  .0853  .0508
Log Likelihood Value  =  -288.831
Notes: The Vj  coefficients denote the parameters of the AR(2) model for the
exchange  rate, Xj coefficients  denote the parameters of an AR(2) model for
the first difference  of real income,  0j coefficients  denote  the parameters  of
an AR(1)  model for grain-consuming animal units with first- and second-
order lags on corn price,  and c  denotes the parameters of an AR(2) model
for the support  price for corn.
Estimation Results
The  above  framework  is used to estimate  a rational expectations  model with risk and
bounded  prices  for the  U.S. corn  market from  1950-90. All  data on prices-including
average  farm prices,  target  prices, and loan rates;  total disappearance;  grain-consuming
animal units; and all production data (i.e., total production, acres planted,  acres set aside
and diverted,  and average yields)-were obtained from various U.S. Department  of Ag-
riculture (USDA) issues  of Feed Situation and Outlook Report. Exchange rates  were ob-
tained from various  issues of the USDA's Agricultural  Outlook. Weather variables were
obtained  from Teigen and Singer.  Disposable income and CPI data were  obtained from
various  issues of the U.S. Department of Commerce's  Survey of Current  Business.
FIML estimation results are reported in table 1. Preliminary estimation results indicated
the presence of first-order autocorrelation  in the residuals of the demand and production
equations. These two equations were subsequently estimated in quasi-difference form with
corresponding autocorrelation  parameters  Pi  and  P2, respectively.  All estimated  supply
and  demand  parameters  have  theoretically  correct  signs  and  many  of the  coefficients
associated with economic variables are significant at usual levels. Importantly,  estimated
coefficients  for expected price  Pf and  for the expected  third central moment of price a3
are both positive,  and the  coefficient for  a3  is  significant at the .05  level. Likewise,  the
estimated coefficient  for expected price variance  o2t is negative  and significant at the .05
level.  The  estimated  coefficient  for initial  wealth  WLTt_1  is  positive  and  significant,
indicating that constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) does not hold. A positive wealth
effect  also is consistent with corn producers exhibiting decreasing  absolute risk aversion
(Sandmo).
Because a riskless model (similar to those considered by Shonkwiler and Maddala and
by Holt and Johnson)  is nested  within the present model, a likelihood  ratio test of the
hypothesis that 72  =  7Y =  0 is appropriate  (e.g.,  a test of the hypothesis that risk effects
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Table 2.  Simulation R2s  for Endogenous  Variables
Endogenous  Variables
QD,  QS,  PCt  ACR,  YLD,  EXR,  INC,  GCU,  P,
.9287  .9061  .8690  .9396  .9135  .9455  .9964  .7473  .9482
Notes: All R2estimates were obtained from auxiliary regressions where the
observed variable is regressed on the corresponding simulated value. The
R2 for PC, was computed by using the unconditional  expectation of price.
in the acreage  supply equation are zero).  The resulting test statistic  is  13.09,  which well
exceeds  the critical  value of 5.991  in the asymptotic  x2(2) distribution  at the .05  level.
Based on these results, it is my conclusion that risk effects  associated  with second and
third moments of the truncated price distribution have a significant impact on corn acreage
planting decisions.
Wald tests for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant partial relative risk
aversion (CPRRA), evaluated at the means of  the sample data, were conducted in a manner
similar to that described by Pope and Just. Test statistics obtained are 9.598 and 16.316,
respectively.  Both critical values  are extreme in the asymptotic  X2(1)  distribution,  indi-
cating  that  neither  CRRA  nor  CPRRA  are  supported  by  the data.  These  results  are
consistent with those obtained by Chavas and Holt for corn and soybean acreage decisions.
The  estimation  results  reveal  that the effective  producer  price  distribution  is  right-
skewed  at all data  points.  Positive  skewness  indicates  the mean  of the producer  price
distribution is above the mode, implying that prices are more likely to be below the mean.
Consequently,  even  though  the underlying  market  price  distribution  is  normal,  price
support programs have resulted in producer price distributions which are no longer sym-
metric.
Given  the  above  results,  the  signs  on  the  coefficients  associated  with  higher-order
moments in the supply equation are plausible. For instance, the negative  sign associated
with a2  is justified under the assumption of risk aversion because risk-averse agents prefer
decreasing  variance  (Meyer).  The positive  sign for  at3  also is reasonable  because  agents
exhibiting decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion prefer positive skewness (Tsiang).
Hence, the empirical evidence is consistent with corn producers exhibiting downside risk
aversion,  a result which has not been established previously in the literature.
The own-price  elasticity of demand  is  -. 554  at the means of the data-an estimate
that compares  favorably with prior estimates  (e.g., Shonkwiler  and Maddala;  Holt  and
Johnson). Implied acreage elasticities with respect to the mean, variance, and third central
moment of price are .052, -. 018, and .015, respectively. The acreage elasticity with respect
to initial wealth  is .074,  a value which  is consistent with that obtained by Chavas  and
Holt.  The mean price  acreage  elasticity  is somewhat  below previous estimates for corn
(e.g.,  Lee and Helmberger;  Chavas and Holt; Holt  1992). This discrepancy  may be due
to the fact that many prior studies either have not included risk terms or have not included
a direct measure of acreage set-asides.' 2
The estimated model was simulated historically, and for each endogenous variable the
actual value  was regressed  on the predicted value and  the computed R2 obtained.  The
results are reported in table 2. In all cases, the R2s are high. In fact, the R2 values for all
endogenous variables except PCt and GCUt are above .90, thus indicating the model does
a good job of predicting quantities supplied and demanded. The R2 for PCt is somewhat
lower, about .86, but still suggests the model does a good job of explaining historical price
adjustments  in the corn market.
Price-Band Stabilization Experiments
The estimated  rational expectations  model  provides  a rich framework  within which  to
examine alternative  price  support  and  stabilization  strategies  in a  market equilibrium
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Table 3.  Simulations of Corn Supply/Demand  Model  with Alternative Minimum and Maximum
Price Levels
Prices  Gross Farm Revenue
Pro-  Higher Moments  Produc-  Gov't. Subsidy  With  Without
Min.  Max.  Market  ducer  Seconda  Thirdb  tion  Unit  Total  Subsidy  Subsidy Percentc
.30  1.70  .756  .756  2.436  .056  4.755  .000  .000  3.59  3.59  .000
.35  1.65  .750  .751  2.421  .138  4.770  .000  .001  3.58  3.58  .000
.40  1.60  .738  .739  2.378  .331  4.804  .001  .004  3.55  3.55  .001
.45  1.55  .707  .710  2.237  .785  4.891  .003  .016  3.47  3.46  .005
.50  1.50  .650  .664  1.799  1.479  5.051  .014  .071  3.35  3.28  .021
.55  1.45  .621  .654  1.305  1.582  5.131  .033  .170  3.36  3.19  .051
.60  1.40  .616  .671  .935  1.349  5.145  .055  .282  3.45  3.17  .082
.65  1.35  .619  .698  .650  1.029  5.137  .079  .406  3.59  3.18  .113
.70  1.30  .624  .732  .428  .712  5.122  .107  .550  3.75  3.20  .147
.75  1.25  .629  .770  .261  .440  5.108  .140  .717  3.93  3.21  .182
.80  1.20  .632  .811  .143  .238  5.099  .179  .912  4.14  3.22  .221
.85  1.15  .633  .856  .069  .107  5.097  .223  1.136  4.36  3.23  .260
.90  1.10  .632  .903  .028  .035  5.101  .271  1.382  4.60  3.22  .300
.95  1.05  .629  .951  .007  .004  5.109  .322  1.646  4.86  3.21  .339
Notes: All results were obtained by simulating the rational expectations model at the means of the sample  data.
All prices are in real terms, and are expressed  in dollars per bushel. Production is in billion bushels. Gross farm
revenues are expressed  in (real) billions of dollars and are defined as production times price.
a All second moment values are multiplied by 100. Also, the variance of the market price distribution is 2.4443.
b  All third-moment  values are multiplied by  1,000.
c Percent  denotes the  proportion of gross farm revenue  (including subsidies) that is attributed to government
support.
setting.  Importantly, expressions for moments of the effective producer price distribution
in (14)-(16) can be readily modified to allow for maximum price limits (e.g.,  truncation
of the upper tail). See the appendix for details. Operationally, a price stabilization program
that uses a system of minimum and maximum prices could be administered in a fashion
similar to that described  in previous  sections.  That is, producers receive a subsidy if the
market price  falls below the minimum price  and pay  a tax if the realized price  is above
the maximum price.
The adjustments in production,  expected market and producer prices, and higher-order
moments of the producer price distribution are examined by simulating the model at the
data means over a wide range of minimum  and maximum  prices. 1 3 Selected results  are
reported in table  3.  Note that low levels of minimum price accompanied  by high levels
of maximum  price have little  impact on expected  prices, risk variables,  or production.
This implies that the market price distribution and the producer price distribution virtually
coincide  for relatively wide minimum-maximum price bands.
As  the range  over which  prices  can  adjust freely  is reduced,  the second  moment  of
producer price  declines  and the third central moment increases initially,  thus providing
a direct incentive  to expand  corn acreage.  However,  higher  production  levels translate
into lower expected market prices and, in turn, lower expected producer prices (fig.  1). In
other words,  the  market  price  effect  initially  dominates  the truncation  effect,  and  the
expected producer price falls. But for minimum price levels exceeding $.55 and maximum
price levels below $1.45,  the truncation effect  outweighs the market price effect,  and the
expected producer price increases  (fig.  1).
Expected production increases initially as the minimum and maximum price limits are
squeezed (fig. 2). This positive production response occurs even though expected producer
prices decline  at first as the price bands are narrowed  (fig.  1).  The implication  is that the
risk reduction induced by the system of minimum and maximum prices more than offsets
the  mean  price  response  over  a wide  range  of price  bands.  This  result  highlights  the
importance  of risk response  in analyzing partial price  stabilization policies because pro-
duction clearly would decline in the absence of risk effects.
The plots in figures  3  and 4 illustrate the effects of alternative price bands on,  respec-
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Figure 2.  Relationship  between expected planted  acreage  and minimum  and maximum prices








Figure 3.  Relationship  between variance  of expected  producer price and minimum and maximum
prices
tively,  the  second  and  third  central  moments  of producer  price.  The  variance  of the
truncated price  distribution clearly has an inverse relationship  with the minimum  price
(fig.  3).  Overall,  there appears  to  be  only limited response  to the maximum  price.  As
Eeckhoudt and Hansen note, there is a spread effect and a location effect that work against
each  other when the maximum price is varied.  Consequently, in a rational expectations
model,  the response  to the maximum  price  in general  will be less pronounced  than the
corresponding  response to the minimum price.
Referring to figure  4,  note that the third  central moment increases  initially  with the
minimum  price  and begins  to  decline  at  the $.50  minimum  price  level.  An  intuitive
explanation  for the non-monotonic  relationship between the third central moment and
the minimum price is not apparent.  This is because not only is the third moment a highly
nonlinear function of the price limits, but it is also a complicated function of the first and
second  moments  of the truncated  price  distribution  as  well. This lack of intuition not-
withstanding, the above results serve to underscore the observation that price stabilization,
as implemented  through  a system  of minimum  and  maximum  price  bands,  can affect
both the shape and the position of the producer price distribution.
Table 3 also provides an illustration of the level of government involvement for selected
minimum  and  maximum  price  bands.  The  expected (real) government  subsidy,  or the
difference between the expected producer price and the expected market price, initially is
negligible, but increases to $.22 per bushel when producers are allowed to face only a $.30
price band.  Of interest is that expected gross farm revenues decline initially as the min-
imum-maximum price band is reduced from the $.30-$1.70 level; however, beyond $.50-
$1.50  band widths,  expected gross farm revenues  increase.  The proportion  of expected
gross farm  revenues  derived  from  government  sources  increases  from  zero  initially  to
over 20% as the minimum-maximum  band widths are reduced  below $.40 (table 3).
Because interactions  between minimum and maximum  prices and the model's endog-
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Figure 4.  Relationship between  third central moment of expected  producer price and minimum and
maximum  prices
enous variables are highly complex,  it is useful to investigate their marginal effects on the
rational expectations equilibrium.  To this end, short-run elasticities and flexibilities with
respect  to the minimum  price are  reported  in table  4  for a wide  range of price  bands.
Planted acreage  elasticities  are initially small and positive,  but increase  rapidly in mag-
Table 4.  Elasticities  for Selected  Variables with Respect  to the Minimum Price
Prices  Higher Moments
Min.  Max.  Market  Producer  Second  Third  Production  (Ki,)  1-  -(K2t)
.30  1.70  -.026  -. 026  -. 021  5.561  .010  6.610  .000
.35  1.65  -.073  -. 067  -. 069  6.208  .028  7.478  -12.500
.40  1.60  -. 203  -.196  -. 240  6.947  .078  8.873  -3.125
.45  1.55  -.601  -.542  -1.023  7.605  .219  11.581  -14.062
.50  1.50  -. 754  -.490  -3.057  3.015  .247  9.468  -16.000
.55  1.45  -. 225  .122  -3.591  -. 923  .070  4.904  -4.902
.60  1.40  .000  .410  -4.139  -2.648  -. 002  3.292  .000
.65  1.35  .097  .580  -5.028  -4.141  -.031  2.538  2.008
.70  1.30  .128  .690  -6.334  -5.888  -.038  2.062  2.277
.75  1.25  .103  .779  -8.145  -8.104  -. 030  1.673  1.683
.80  1.20  .040  .850  -10.496  -10.924  -.013  1.294  .683
.85  1.15  -. 024  .911  -13.348  -14.674  .006  .916  -. 282
.90  1.10  -.079  .953  -17.096  -21.286  .023  .579  -. 967
.95  1.05  -.111  .978  -26.018  -49.530  .034  .323  -1.340
Notes:  All results were obtained by simulating the rational expectations model at the means of the sample  data.
Variable 4(K 1 t)  denotes the probability that the expected market price  will be below the minimum price,  and
1 - ((K2t) is the probability that the expected market price will be above the maximum  price.
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nitude  as the  band width is narrowed  to the $.50-$1.50  level. Over  the same range  of
price bands, expected producer price flexibilities are negative and fall in magnitude.  This
is because  truncation  effects  associated  with  the minimum  and  maximum  price  limits
cause reductions  in risk (as captured by the second and third central  moments), with the
result  that  planted  acres  expand.  A  positive  production  response  subsequently  places
downward  pressure on expected  market and producer prices.
Table  4 also illustrates that for band widths above the $.50-$1.50 level,  acreage  elas-
ticities  with  respect  to the  minimum  price  decline  in magnitude  and  actually become
negative  at  some  point.  Over the  same  range,  expected  producer  price  flexibilities  are
everywhere  positive and increasing in magnitude.  This pattern of response  is interesting
because,  as noted  in table  4,  variance  elasticities  are  everywhere  negative  and  decline
monotonically as band widths are narrowed.  Consequently,  "shape"  effects,  as measured
by  the third  moment,  play  an  important  role  in  determining  both  the  direction  and
magnitude of production responses. For narrow band widths (above the $.85-$ 1.15 level),
acreage elasticities are again positive, indicating that the expected producer price response
dominates the risk response.  Overall, these results help underscore the importance of risk
effects in determining the outcome of a partial price  stabilization  scheme.
Conclusions
Previous  research  has not adequately  addressed  the  relationship  between  government
price  support programs and  subjective  price and  risk expectations  of producers in agri-
cultural markets. To explore this issue,  conceptual and empirical models were developed
that included minimum and maximum  price limits, risk-averse  producers,  and rational
expectations.  Following Eeckhoudt  and Hansen,  a system of minimum  and maximum
prices was assumed to truncate producers'  subjective density function of price.  The em-
pirical  analysis  was  based  on a  bounded  price  variation  model that included  rational
expectations of the first three central moments of the effective producer price distribution.
The empirical framework  was used to obtain FIML estimates of a model of the  U.S.
corn  market.  Among  other things, the results show that wealth  effects  are important  in
aggregate  supply decisions and that producers behave in a manner consistent with down-
side risk aversion. This is among the first known studies to incorporate a measure of risk
beyond  the  second  moment  into  an  aggregate  agricultural  supply  model.  Overall,  the
results indicate that the third-moment term is both statistically and economically  signif-
icant.  Future research  into the  effects  of risk  on aggregate  supply decisions-especially
when government  programs  are present-thus  should attempt to incorporate  third-mo-
ment measures of risk.
The estimated  model  was  used to investigate equilibrium  (reduced-form)  impacts  of
alternative minimum and maximum price levels  on the U.S. corn market. It was found,
for  instance,  that  because  of market  price  feedback,  expected  producer  prices  actually
decline over a wide range of minimum and maximum price bands; however, production
levels generally increased, even when the expected producer price declined.  This result is
attributed to the risk reduction arising  from the truncation of the producer price  distri-
bution, and highlights the importance  of analyzing government price support and stabi-
lization programs in a market equilibrium-rational  expectations context.
[Received December 1992; final revision received June 1994.]
Notes
Indeed, a frequent justification  for government intervention  in agricultural  markets  is that risk is reduced
and overall market efficiency  subsequently is improved  (Newbery and Stiglitz).
2  Innes (1990b)  does explore the implications of a target price-deficiency  payment program along with pro-
duction  controls  in a market with multiplicative  production uncertainty and  risk-averse producers;  however,
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his analysis  is conducted at a very aggregate  level (e.g.,  the market  for "food")  and, as such, may be of limited
use for analyzing the effects of government intervention in specific markets. More importantly, his model allows
for only two states  of nature  (e.g., good weather versus  bad weather)  and key parameters were not estimated
econometrically.
3  This hypothetical system of minimum and maximum price bands is similar to the target price-deficiency
payment scheme  used in the U.S.  and elsewhere.  The policy considered here is more general, in that an upper
price bound also  is included.
4  The  notation used  for  firm-level  decisions  implies  the  price  distribution  g(v  I  Q) can  be  characterized
adequately  by a finite number of its  central  moments.  While this assumption  may not always  be theoretically
valid, Kendall and Stuart show that a probability distribution can be approximated to the nth degree by an nth
degree  polynomial  whose  coefficients  are functions  of the first  n moments of the distribution.  This moment-
based approach  also is  consistent with the procedure used in many  empirical studies where expected  utility is
approximated  by a Taylor series  (Antle 1983).
5  Quiggin and Anderson obtain essentially the same results by  using a stochastic dominance approach.
6 This can occur, for instance, if  the minimum and maximum prices are positioned in the tails of  the distribution
f(p  I  Q). In this  case,  small changes  in Pm and  PM would  have little  direct  effect  because  the  probabilities
F(Pm I Q) and  1 - F(pM I Q) would not change much.
7  The estimation framework focuses  on a situation where only  minimum prices  apply. This is because  gov-
ernment programs in the U.S. historically have relied only on price supports (e.g., minimum prices). As illustrated
in the appendix,  the model is easily  modified to accommodate  a situation where maximum prices also apply.
8  When  implementing the  model,  the parameters  in  1,,  &2,  13,  and 2  used in  deriving  (18)  are  estimated
simultaneously  with the parameters of the structural  model (table  1). Operationally,  this requires an unconcen-
trated  likelihood function  be used to obtain FIML estimates  of the model's  parameters.  The result is that the
(fixed) variance of the market price distribution (18)  is estimated, in accordance with the rational expectations
hypothesis,  by using the error process  associated with the "true model."
9  A linear approximation to the (obviously) nonlinear  production identity in planted acres and average yields
is used here because the effects of truncation on the moments of the effective producer price distribution derived
in previous  sections  are valid  only when the model's  endogenous  variables  are linear transformations  of un-
derlying random error terms.
10  When solving the rational  expectations model, it is necessary to account for the fact that producers do not
know with certainty what idled acres will be. Participation in U.S. commodity programs is voluntary, and hence
the amount of land retired is, in essence, endogenous. However, complications arise when attempting to formally
endogenize  acres  diverted  under  government  programs  because  acreage  set-asides  have  not always  been  a
precondition  for receiving price  support protection.  Rather than tackle the additional problems associated  with
endogenizing land retirement programs for corn, I have instead linked acres diverted to price support levels and
effective diversion payments by using a quadratic  specification. The resulting OLS estimates  were then used to
predict acres idled when solving the rational expectations model.
" In the Fair and Taylor  (1983) iterations, the expected  value for  WI,  in the yield equation  was set equal to
zero (the average value for WI,). The assumption is that producers expect "normal" temperature and precipitation
conditions to prevail  when forming price expectations.
12 For example,  Lee  and  Helmberger  report  corn  acreage  own-price  elasticities  ranging  from  .118  for free
market  years  to  .249  for farm  program  years.  Similarly,  Chavas  and  Holt report  a corn  acreage  own-price
elasticity of .158 and a corn acreage price risk (e.g., variance) elasticity of .02. Holt (1992) reports an own-price
elasticity of corn supply of .223.
13  The range used is $1.81  to $1.02  per bushel for the (real) maximum price and $.21  to $1 per bushel for the
minimum  price. The prices were incremented  in $.01  intervals, resulting in 6,400  model simulations.
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Appendix
Using an  approach  similar to  that  described  in  the  text,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  expressions  relating  the
expectations of the first three central moments of the truncated normal price distribution to both minimum and
maximum price limits are:
(Al)  P,  = P,,'(K,,) + a,o[(K 1,) - (K 2 t )] + P*[(c(K2)  -4(K, 1)] + P[l  -b(K2),
(A2)  Ov2  = P2,'K(K,)  +  r2[KIK,0(Kt, ) - K2,(K2t)]
+ 2Pt*ap[0(Kt)  - 0(K2)]  + [P*
2 + aP][((K2)  - P(Kt)]  + P  1 2 [  - (K2t)] - 2,
(A3)  at  = P2t[Pt  - 3Pf]P(K,)  + a[K,  (Kt) - K  2(K 2 t)]  + 3(P* - Pt)[K,(Kt)  - K(K2t)]
+ [2a  + 3P*2a - 6PeP*ap*][(Kt,)- 0(K2t)] + [P*3  - 3PtP*
2 + 3a2(P* - P)]' [  -(K  t)  (K2t)]
+ P 2 ,[P  2t-  3Pt][l  - (K 2 ,)]  + 2Pft,
where
0  2  -3 (A4)  K,, = [P,  - (a*)-l'(Xet  + /3*PT  + :  +  B  - )]/p,
(A5)  K2t = [P2 t  - (a*)-'(1Xe2t  +  -lP  t +  3*  t  +  - a*X  t)]/.p,
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(A6)  1 - (K,)=  Prob[(a*)-l(u2, - u)  > P,  - (a*)-'(IX2, +  *P  +  *a  +  3*  - a'X)],
and
(A7)  1 -(K2t)  = Prob[(a*)-l(u2t - u)  >  2t - (a*)-l(X2t, + fPtP  +  fO2  +  3f  - aI,)].
Here,  P, denotes  the minimum  guaranteed  price  and P2,  denotes the  maximum  guaranteed  price.  All  other
variables are as defined in the text. For purposes of simulating the model with both minimum and maximum
prices, the expressions in (A1)-(A7) are substituted for those in (14)-(18).